The manner in which this review was carried out, and the goals and assertions of the final document was and remains flawed. Defining in concrete terms when you will and when you won't use nuclear weapons in the dangerous world in which we reside is at best a foolish exercise, and at worst a dangerous errand into the land of folly. Any policy on this subject will be out of date by the time it is complete, and will surely fail to meet the challenges we face in the quagmire of a post-super power world in which we now reside. The definitions in the report will fail to be applicable to the context of almost any circumstance going forward. They will largely be an albatros that constrains our national ability to cajole our enemies to see things our way as well as fail to reassure our friends of our ability to aid them under the most dire of possible outcomes.
To put it another way, diagraming on paper when we will and when we won't use nuclear weapons to return our enemies to the stone age, will only lead to more aggression. It will, and as some have argued already has, weakened our position in our negotiations with the regime in Iran, and with other rogue states around the globe. It doesn't lead to an outbreak of unprecedented peace the globe over as some would contend, but rather it reinforces the notion that some of our enemies hold that we are a weak, paper tiger incapable of the resolve necessary to see anything through to completion.
The review's authors and many proponents of the review both in the Pentagon and in other places in the executive branch fail to grasp the most fundamental truth of the world in which we reside. We live in a world that for all of its history, has been governed not by the good intentions of well-meaning politicians, but rather its governed by the aggressive use of force. It is a sad statement of truth, but it is true nonetheless. The nuclear policy review failed miserably, because its flawed misunderstanding on this p. We cannot and we should not count on the goodwill of the world at large on this issue.
We have to operate from the understanding that someday we will confront a circumstance that requires a nuclear response. It is only in planning for the worst, that the genie that is nuclear armageddon stays in the bottle. Weakening our stance, or clearly defining our policy for the aggressors and would-be enemies the world over does not ensure peace. It removes from their mind the possibility that a mushroom cloud could be coming to a venue near them and soon.
The policy smacks of the type of appeasment that Chamberlin tried with the Nazis in the 1930's. It smacks of weakness and smells like a putrid recipe for failure. Chamberlinian appeasment has failed every time it has been tried. The plethora of nuclear arms treaties that were hammered out in the 1960's and 1970's did nothing to deter aggression from the Soviet Union. The merely locked into place a misguided arrangement of numerical superiority for the Soviets. The treaties reeked of indecision and incompetance and our foreign policy efforts were constrained as a direct result of them.
The only thing that has ever or will ever work in this arena is a peace through strength approach. By that, I mean making America as strong as possible is the only method of deterring future aggression on the part of rogue nations and bad actors the world over.
What Obama should have done in this area is simple. He should have classified our nation's nuclear response policy top secret. He should have told everyone that our nation's interests are best served when our enemies have no clue as to how we might respond in any given circumstance. As someone who has ridden the tip of the nuclear deterrence spear on a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, I can assure you that the policy I am articulating here is the only one that has ever or will ever work. It kept the peace throughout the cold war, and in our less secure turbulent and turgid world that seems to getting crazier by the minute, its the only policy stance that stands a chance of working now.